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ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to analyze the change of the Russian Federa-
tion’s international image in the light of two significant events: the Olympic Win-
ter Games in 2014 in Sochi and the annexation of Crimea. According to the first 
hypothesis, one of the main aims for hosting the Olympic Games was to improve 
the international prestige of Russia. Shortly after the Olympics Russia increased 
its activity in Eastern Ukraine, which resulted in the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula. Therefore the article is also aimed to investigate whether by annexing 
Crimea Russia squandered the possible positive effects of hosting the Olympics in 
terms of its international image.
KEYWORDS: International image of Russia, Olympic Games in Sochi, Annexation 
of Crimea, sport and politics
The Olympic Winter Games in Russian city of Sochi was the 
most important sports mega-event of the beginning of 2014. Shortly 
after, the world witnessed one of the biggest crises in European 
politics that resulted in the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimean 
Peninsula by the Russian Federation, although the events are still 
in progress. These two occurrences are completely oppositional in 
terms of international image of Russia. The Sochi Olympics were 
meant to improve the prestige of Russia worldwide. Russian in-
volvement in the Ukraine on the other hand is regarded as undoing 
all of the efforts concerning hosting Olympic Winter Games.
Hosting a sports mega-event in most cases has strong political 
meaning and can be aimed to enhance a nation’s prestige, praise 
its political system, promote tourism, and promote the country in 
1 The research has been financed by National Science Centre, Poland, within 
project number 2015/19/D/HS5/00513.
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general. The attempt to acquire prestige is typical for states re-
garded as not fully democratic. This was strongly an issue of for 
example Olympic Summer Games in Beijing in 2008. Therefore the 
first aim of the article is to analyze whether Russia intended to im-
prove its international image by hosting the Olympic Games and 
whether it succeeded.
The second part of the article will concern the events in the 
Ukraine that resulted in annexation of Crimea by Russian Federa-
tion. Although the political crisis in Ukraine began before the So-
chi Olympics, it appears that Russian involvement became heavier 
after the Olympic flame was distinguished in Sochi. Such a situ-
ation leads to certain doubts concerning the policy of Russia and 
its president Vladimir Putin. Obviously at the moment information 
about the true intentions and plans of V. Putin are uncertain. It ap-
pears though, that he did not want the political crisis to affect the 
course of the Games. Moreover, if the purpose of hosting the Olym-
pic Games was to improve international image of Russia, than why 
did Putin decide to involve Russia in the Ukrainian crisis and to an-
nex Crimea? Was it a planned strategy or an unplanned reaction 
to political unrests in Ukraine? The hypothesis to be investigated in 
this part states that by annexing Crimea, Russia squandered all the 
possible positive effects of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games in terms 
of its international image.
The research will be conducted under the interpretativist para-
digm which seems to be the most appropriate in analyzing such 
a complicated reality as the international perception of a state in 
respect to two important events: the Olympics in Sochi and the an-
nexation of Crimea. The research encompassed studying of state-
ments of high profile policy makers and journalist from various 
countries, in order to deduce the changing attitude towards Russia, 
which obviously required an interpretation of their words. Accord-
ingly, the data was collected mainly by analyzing press articles and 
interviews. This enabled not only the main analysis of the change of 
attitude towards Russia worldwide, but also to determine the main 
objectives behind organizing the Olympic Winter Games in 2014 by 
the Russian city of Sochi.
Election of Sochi as the Host of the Olympic Winter Games 2014
The Russian city of Sochi was chosen as host of 2014 Olym-
pic Winter Games on 4th July 2007, at the 119th Session of the 
International Olympic Committee in Guatemala City (Sochi 2014). 
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The election, according to The Olympic Charter, is constituted by 
two phases: the application and the candidacy, and takes place 7 
years before the Games. The Session of the IOC elects the host city 
among the candidate cities – those applicant cities that were ac-
cepted to the latter phase of election by the IOC Executive Board 
(Olympic Charter 68–69).
In the case of the election of the host of the XXII Olympic Win-
ter Games in 2014, there were seven applicant cities: Sochi (Rus-
sia), Salzburg (Austria), Jaca (Spain), Almaty (Kazakhstan), Py-
eongChang (Korea), Sofia (Bulgaria), and Borjomi (Georgia). All 
those cities were evaluated by the IOC Candidature Acceptance 
Working Group, which took into consideration such elements as: 
government support, legal issues and public opinion; general infra-
structure; sports venues; Olympic village(s); environmental condi-
tions and impact; accommodation; transport concept; safety and 
security; experience from past sports events; finance and overall 
project and legacy, with different weighting of different issues. All 
the results in each issue were evaluated mathematically in order 
to present the final results in a table (Report by the IOC Candida-
ture Acceptance Working Group 9, 11–12).
Table 1. Results of the IOC Candidature Acceptance Working Group evaluation
Source: Report by the IOC Candidature Acceptance Working Group to the IOC 
Executive Board. XXII Olympic Winter Games in 2014, Lausanne 28 April 2006
On the basis of the IOC Working Group report, summarized 
by the table above, on 22nd June 2006 the IOC’s Executive Board 
selected three applicant cities to be forwarded to the Candidature 
phase (Sochi 2014). Apparently the Executive Board must have tak-
en into consideration the recommendations by the Working Group, 
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as three cities with the best evaluation have been forwarded: Sochi, 
Salzburg, and PyeongChang.
According to the procedure of electing the host city of the Olym-
pic Games, once the candidate cities are selected, the IOC President 
appoints an Evaluation Commission, which studies the candida-
tures, inspects the sites and on that basis prepares a report for the 
IOC Members (Olympic Charter 69). In the report the Commission 
evaluates each candidate city in various categories, relatively simi-
lar to those from the first phase of the election. In this case they 
were as follows: Olympic Games Concept and Legacy, Political and 
Economic Climate and Structure, Legal Matters, Customs and Im-
migration Formalities, Environment and Meteorology, Finance, Mar-
keting, Sports and Venues, Olympic Villages, Paralympic Games, 
Medical Services and Doping Control, Security, Accommodation, 
Transport, Media Operations, Olympism and Culture (IOC 2014 
Evaluation Commission Report 10–28).
In the summaries each of the candidatures has been evaluated 
shortly in the key dimensions. Generally all of them were rated 
positively. Each of the bids had financial guarantees from national 
governments that were willing to cover any possible shortfalls of 
the budgets, as well as all three concepts of the Games were evalu-
ated positively. In the case of Sochi, the Commission noted that 
the completion of the infrastructure projects was critical for the 
Games. Salzburg, on the other hand, was criticized for the pre-
sentation lacking details, number of hotel rooms slightly below re-
quirements, underestimating resources required for security opera-
tions and low budget comparing to previous Olympics. Therefore 
Salzburg’s bid seemed to be rated lowest. The Commission did not 
have substantial objections towards Korean bid, praised it for cred-
ible budget and noted, that the Olympic Games would contribute 
to peace and harmony on Korean Peninsula (IOC 2014 Evaluation 
Commission Report 67–72). Apparently the events before the previ-
ous Olympics organized by South Korea, especially the desire to co-
host the Games by North Korea, did not raise any doubts towards 
PyeongChang’s candidacy.
The election of the host city of the Olympic Games requires an 
absolute majority of votes. If no city gains the required number of 
votes, the one with lowest support is eliminated and the Members 
of the IOC vote again. In case of the election of the 2014 Olympic 
Winter Games Salzburg was eliminated in the 1st round, while Sochi 
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was elected by narrow margin in the 2nd round. The exact results 
have been presented below.
Table 2. Results of the election of the host of the XXII Olympic Winter  
Games in 2014
Round 1 2
Sochi 34 51
PyeongChang 36 47
Salzburg 25
Source: www.olympic.org
As can be noted, the IOC Session seemed to have taken into 
consideration remarks of the Evaluation Commission. As was men-
tioned, the biggest objections regarded the Salzburg’s bid and this 
candidate city was ruled out first. Korean city PyeongChang was in 
the lead in the first round, but eventually received four points less 
in the final voting. Worth mentioning, it was the PyeongChang that 
was seen as a favorite and the final outcome was rather unexpected.
From the very beginning Russian president Vladimir Putin 
was strongly involved in the idea of organizing the Olympic Winter 
Games in Sochi, to that extent that he personally led the formal 
presentation during the International Olympic Committee Ses-
sion in Guatemala City (Zakarhovich). He spoke about great loca-
tion of the city – spring weather at the seashore and winter with 
guaranteed snow in the mountains, promised that Olympic cluster 
in Sochi would be completed on time and guaranteed that there 
would be no traffic jams (Russia Awarded Its First Winter Games). 
His personal presence was seen as a great benefit for the Sochi 
bid, similarly to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair supporting 
London’s candidacy for the 2012 Summer Olympics. As one of the 
IOC Members Jean-Claude Killy evaluated the presence of Russian 
President, “The Putin charisma can explain four votes.” He also 
noted, that Vladimir Putin “spoke English and French, what he 
never does” (Delany, O’Flynn).
The Russian bid was criticized for various reasons. Austrian 
Chancellor was supposed to have said after the election of Sochi, 
that “Salzburg didn’t stand a chance....It was an economic and po-
litical power play...which indicates the way they want to go from 
now on, and this is wrong for the sport and for the IOC and Olym-
pic Movement” (Zarakhovich). Despite the obvious aggrieved tone in 
this statement, it is true that in the aspect of financing it was hard 
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to compete with Sochi’s bid – Vladimir Putin pledged $12 billion for 
Sochi’s development during his pre-vote speech in Guatemala City 
(Delany, O’Flynn).
Thus, it was decided by the International Olympic Committee 
Session that it would be Sochi hosting the Olympic Winter Games 
in 2014. It must be said that the IOC takes various criteria in select-
ing the Olympic Games host city, such as organizational capability, 
geographical (alternation of regions of the World), traditional and 
political (Kobierecki, Polityczne implikacje 102–106). It appears that 
currently, once the Olympic Games gained enormous popularity and 
an unquestioned status of a sports mega-event, the organizational 
capability is the most important factor for selecting a particular bid. 
Other criteria are rather supplementary. Sochi’s candidature had 
strong financial guarantees given personally by the President of Rus-
sia Vladimir Putin and it must have been a great advantage. But the 
bid of Korean PyeongChang appeared as a choice just as safe in this 
matter. Accordingly, it appears that political aspect may have played 
its role as well. Sochi candidature was closely bound with Putin, so 
the final, unexpected decision could be derived from his personal 
image as a leader of Russia. The words of Jean-Claude Killy, cited 
earlier, seem to confirm this statement.
Sochi 2014 and its meaning for Russia
Once Sochi was elected as the host of the Olympic Winter 
Games in 2014, the preparations began. According to the plans of 
Russian organizers, the Olympics were to be the most extravagant 
in the history of Winter Games. The project included construction 
of high-speed rail line and a road between Sochi and the moun-
tains (Harrison), as well as sports venues and two Olympic villages. 
Almost everything was to be built from scratch – 85 percent of 
the infrastructure needed, according to chair of the International 
Olympic Committee’s coordination commission for the Sochi Games 
Jean-Claude Killy (Most expensive Olympics in history).
The Olympic Winter Games in Sochi are believed to be the most 
expensive in Games’ history. Russian Ministry of Regional Develo-
ment estimated it to have cost around $42 billion (Karnaukh). How-
ever, according to calculations by various experts, the cost of pre-
paring and hosting the Olympics in 2014 was $51 billion, although 
it is very difficult to rate the expenditures precisely as the sums 
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have been artificially inflated by the private sponsors of the Olym-
pics, according to Igor Nikolaev, director of a department in one of 
Russian audit groups (Most expensive Olympics in history, Russia’s 
$9.4B road to Sochi latest in long line of Olympic boondoggles). As he 
said, the private sector tried to qualify as much of their expenses 
as possible as the Olympic costs, which would later serve as their 
advantage in applying for instance for preferential tariffs (Gibson, 
Sochi 2014, Gibson, Sochi Games). After all the Sochi Olympics 
were a great aim and ambition of Vladimir Putin, so Russian com-
panies involved in the Olympics wanted their contribution to appear 
as big as possible.
Sochi cost a lot more than other contemporary Olympics – 
London 2012 is believed to have cost $13.9 billion, while China 
is believed to have spent $43 billion on the Beijing 2008 Olym-
pics (Gibson, Sochi 2014). It must be mentioned here, that summer 
Olympics are a far more complicated and far bigger event than the 
winter ones. The following numbers can serve as an example of 
such disproportion: in London about 10,500 athletes competed in 
26 sports across 34 venues, whereas in Sochi there were around 
2,800 athletes participating in 7 sports across 10 venues (Sports, 
Sochi 2014 Venues, How many athletes and countries took part in 
the 2014 Games in Sochi?, LONDON 2012).
There are various reason why the Sochi Olympics were so ex-
pensive. Apart from the fact that they were meant to be the best 
in history, the whole concept of organizing a winter sports event in 
a basically subtropical city at Black Sea coastline was extraordi-
nary, and costly at the same time. For instance in case of melting 
of the snow there were 450,000 cubic meters stored (Vaughan). 
What is more, it is believed that plenty of money has “disappeared 
in corrupt building contracts.” According to Russian oppositionists 
Leonid Martynyuk and Boris Nemtsov, up to $30 billion have been 
lost because of “absence of fair competition, clan politics and the 
strictest censorship about anything related to the Olympic Games” 
(Gibson, Sochi 2014).
The key question here is what and how Vladimir Putin wanted 
to achieve with the use of the Olympic Games in Sochi? Putin him-
self in one of the interviews stated the aims of hosting this sports 
mega-event. The Russian president spoke about the need to build 
a tourist destination within the Russia, as the Russians are on the 
top of the list of nations traveling for holidays abroad; developing 
the South of the country in terms of infrastructure; establishing 
training facilities for Russian athletes. He also said, that through 
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the Olympics he would want the world to see “a new Russia, see 
its personality and its possibilities, take a fresh and unbiased look 
at the country,” which would help Russia to establish relations 
with its partners around the world (I want Sochi Games to show 
the world a new Russia – Putin). On another occasion Putin also 
said that he hoped Sochi would help “build bridges” (Rosenberg). 
These were obviously the declared aims only. It must be noted 
though, that Vladimir Putin did not hide that one of the key aims 
was to show Russia in a positive light, which means to enhance its 
international image. This seems typical for organizers of sports me-
ga-events, regardless the political system of the hosting state. Still, 
it appears that the desire to build positive state’s image through 
sport is greater in non-democratic countries, similarly to the case 
of the Olympics in Beijing.
A question appears though, whether there were also other rea-
sons for organizing the Olympics in Sochi? Observers pointed out 
various reasons, such as that the aim was to demonstrate both 
to the world and to Russians that Putin had restored wealth and 
pride to Russia and that Putin himself was frightened of nothing 
– to show that Russia was back and that stability had returned 
to Causacus, as Jeffrey Mankoff from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies said (Rubin). As a journalist Mark Mackinnon 
stated, Putin’s dream is to see “Russia as once again a global center 
of gravity, indispensable on the world stage...the leader of a new 
bloc of nations – the Eurasian Union – with borders that look a lot 
like those of the Soviet empire, whose fall he has openly mourned.”
Considering the opinions of the observers and public state-
ments of Vadimir Putin leads to a conclusion that the main aim of 
organizing the Olympic Winter Games in 2014 was to show Russia 
as a powerful, wealthy country and a regional leader. Putin is be-
lieved to have restored Russian pride, weakened by the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. The Sochi Olympics were then meant to show, 
as Putin said himself, the new Russia, strong again. The message 
was to be directed to Russians most of all, but also to the rest of 
the world.
Such use of sport, aimed to project the image of state, scholars 
describe as one of the dimensions of sports diplomacy, which can 
be perceived as a perfect channel of sharing state’s identity, values 
and brand (Pigman, Rofe). Sports diplomacy as a rule is directed to-
wards the external actors, such as societies of other countries, but 
the case of Sochi Olympics appears to have had internal meaning 
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as well. Accordingly to what has already been said, the Games were 
meant, inter alia, to project the masculinist image of Russia, as 
a country powerful enough to restore the past significance of the 
Soviet Union. Obviously, such message was mostly directed to the 
people of Russia, as internationally this could be understood nega-
tively, with the exception to societies that were already under strong 
Russian influence. 
Putin’s aim in organizing the Olympics was not only to show 
Russia strong, but also civilized. Prior to the Olympics, Putin even 
initiated a so called “charm offensive,” within which he set up spe-
cial protests zones on the outskirts of Sochi and declared amnesty 
for several high profile political prisoners such as Pussy Riot activ-
ists or Mikhail Chodorkovsky (Wiertz). Still, the power of Russia was 
probably the key issue. 
This message was to be sent during the Sochi Olympics in vari-
ous ways, each planned to show them as special. One of the first 
dimensions was the Olympic torch relay. Its tradition can be traced 
back to the 1936 Olympic Summer Games in Berlin and it is meant 
to promote such issues as peace, human rights, and democracy 
(Barney, Bijkerk: 253–254; Karamichas; Amelidou: 127), at least 
according to the objectives. On some occasions Olympic torch re-
lay also had political connotations. This was especially an issue of 
the Beijing Olympics torch relay, when protests against China not 
respecting human rights and occupying Tibet occurred in various 
cities during the relay, such as Paris or London (Walker, Batty; 
Burns).
Russian organizers of the Olympics wanted their torch relay 
to be record-breaking, the longest ever for instance. The Olympic 
flame was carried to a few extraordinary locations, such as peak 
of Europe’s highest mountain Mount Elbrus, the bottom of world’s 
deepest Lake Baikal, and to the International Space Station (Walk-
er, Winter Olympics torch). Lately, there is a tendency of achieving 
extraordinary places on the Olympic flame’s route: for instance, 
the Chinese carried it to the summit of Mount Everest before the 
Beijing Olympics (Wong). At the same time, the Olympic torch relay 
is meant to present a country hosting the Olympics to the world in 
a desirable way. This was one of the purposes of Sochi torch relay. 
As Vladimir Putin once said, it was meant to “show the world Rus-
sia as she is and as we love her.” Contrary to his intentions, the 
relay met Greenpeace activists protesting against drilling in the Arc-
tic, gay rights protesters, had to be shortened in Dagestan because 
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of security reasons, whereas the torch itself got extinguished a cou-
ple of times (Walker, Winter Olympics torch). Still, it must be noticed 
that according to plans and intentions the Olympic flame relay was 
meant to show Russia in a good light, in other words, to enhance 
its international image.
It is typical that the organizers of sports mega-events desire 
to impress the world with the venues. For example, the organizers 
of the Beijing Olympics wanted to impress with Olympic Stadium 
“Bird’s Nest” and “Water Cube” where aquatic competitions were 
held. Sochi seems to have not had such extraordinary venues, how-
ever each of them was applauded by the athletes (Williams). It was 
similar with the opening ceremony, another element that makes it 
easy to promote the organizer worldwide. As in most such cases, it 
was planned to promote Russian culture and heritage, but accord-
ing to most observers did not stand out from the previous Olympic 
ceremonies, especially comparing to London 2012 Olympic opening 
ceremony which was evaluated extremely well. On the other hand, 
the Games in Sochi faced many imperfections such as unfinished 
hotels (Dewey) that were affecting the overview of the Games.
As for the opening ceremony, there were also some political 
controversies concerning the Olympics in Sochi. As a matter of fact, 
the event was an object of a boycott by various politicians, who re-
signed from participating in it. This was especially caused by the 
law banning “gay propaganda” that was imposed in Russia. There-
fore, a number of political leaders from various countries, such 
as Barack Obama, David Cameron, or Angela Merkel, decided not 
to participate in the ceremony (Walker, Sochi Winter Olympics).
Despite some minor imperfections, Russians succeeded in im-
pressing the world with the use of the Olympics in Sochi. For in-
stance, they managed to win in the prestigious Olympic medal table 
– a measure that considers gold medals won by a nation, than silver 
ones in case more than one team have won the same amount of 
gold ones, and respectively bronze medals. The table is called unof-
ficial as the International Olympic Committee does not approve it, 
nevertheless in the contemporary world constructing it is so com-
mon that it is even published on the Olympic Games host’s website. 
In Sochi the top of this table was as below.
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Table 3. Olympic Medal Table Sochi 2014
Rank Country Gold Medal Silver Medals Bronze Medal Total
1 Russian Fed. 13 11 9 33
2 Norway 11 5 10 26
3 Canada 10 10 5 25
4 United States 9 7 12 28
5 Netherlands 8 7 9 24
Source: http://www.sochi2014.com/en/medals
The political use of the Olympic medal table is quite typical, 
although this applies rather to summer Games. Sports race with 
political meaning was typical for the Cold War era, but also in more 
contemporary world states wanted to show themselves as power-
ful by winning the Olympic medal table, for instance China during 
Olympics in Beijing 2008. At the same time, it is typical that the 
hosting country of sports mega-event desires to perform well on its 
own soil (Kobierecki, Sportowy wymiar: 37–87). Sports successes 
are regarded as proof of various characteristics of a country, in-
cluding its power. Only big, wealthy, and powerful states are able 
to perform well in multi-sports events such as the Olympics, so it 
is partly similar to the organizational dimension of such events. 
Therefore, states that desire an image of strong and powerful often 
struggle to train as many good athletes as possible.
As can be seen in the table above, Russia succeeded in this di-
mension of the Olympics, although it did not achieve all the main 
athletic goals. Vladimir Putin did not hide that he hoped most of 
all for the victory in ice hockey, whereas the Russian team lost 
to Finland 3–1 in quarter-final and did not win a medal (Chadband). 
Despite this disappointment, Russian athletes performed really well 
in Sochi, considering that 4 years earlier during the Vancouver 
Olympic Winter Games Russian Federation finished 11th with only 
3 gold medals (Winter Olympics 2010).
Despite a number of negative aspects such as the mentioned 
unfinished hotels or lack of some high profile world leaders on the 
opening ceremony, the Sochi Olympics were evaluated very positive-
ly worldwide. As one of the journalists stated, “things went surpris-
ingly well from an organizational standpoint. The venues were state-
of-the-art, buses were on time, and, most important of all, security 
held up and the Games were terrorism-free” (Kaufman). Sochi’s PR 
indeed was bad before the Games, but the Games in the end were 
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regarded as a success. The volunteers were especially praised for 
being helpful and kind (Walker, Winter Olympic volunteers). Another 
thing is whether Vladimir Putin actually achieved his goals by orga-
nizing the Olympic Games in Sochi? As was stated earlier, his inten-
tions most probably involved showing Russia as strong and powerful 
again, both to Russians and to the world. He also wanted to show 
Russia as a civilized, developed, peaceful state, contrary to its ag-
gressive perception derived from the Cold War times.
It appears that Vladimir Putin, despite a few mishaps, used the 
occasion of hosting the Olympic Games according to his intentions. 
By organizing a winter sports mega-event in a sub-tropical area 
for an astronomic sum of around $51 billion he sent a clear signal 
to the world – that Russia is capable of anything. Few countries 
in the world would be able to devote as much for a sports event. 
Moreover, success of the athletes and enormous growth of medal 
won comparing to the previous Winter Olympics also was evidence 
for the power of Russia. The behavior of Russians working at the 
Games, the volunteers most of all, on the other hand worked as an 
evidence of the civilized attitude of Russia. This was additionally 
enhanced by Putin’s steps before the games, such as releasing the 
imprisoned Mikhail Chodorkovsky. All of those facts testify for the 
hypothesis that Sochi 2014 Olympic Winter Games were successful 
in terms of enhancing Russia’s international perception.
Russian Involvement in the Crimean Crisis
The political events known as the Crimean Crisis were pre-
luded by the so called 2014 Ukrainian revolution, which needs 
to be described shortly. The whole situation started when Presi-
dent of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign an asso-
ciation agreement with the European Union in November 2013, 
due to Russia’s pressure as it is believed. Shortly after, tens of 
thousands Ukrainians began their protests in Kiev (Grytsenko). The 
number of protesters quickly began to rise despite attacks by the 
police, to reach 800,000 in early December. Soon Ukrainian Presi-
dent Yanukovych received support from Vladimir Putin, as Russia 
agreed to buy $15 billion of Ukrainian debt and to reduce prices of 
gas that Russia delivers to Ukraine (Ukraine crisis timeline).
Since then the situation calmed down, but several hundred 
people remained on the Independence Square in Kiev and kept 
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protesting. The crisis got escalated again in the mid-January 2014, 
when Ukrainian parliament passed anti-protest law (Ukraine parlia-
ment pushes through sweeping anti-protest law). Soon the talks of 
the oppositionists with Ukrainian president failed and first protest-
ers got killed during clashes with police (Polityuk, Zinets; Danilova, 
Karmanau). As a result the anti-governmental protests expanded 
beyond Kiev and protesters began to storm regional offices in cities 
of Western Ukraine (Ukraine unrest). The governmental side seemed 
to step back and the situation began to calm down again due to an 
offer of amnesty for all the detained protesters (Olearchyk). The 
clashes erupted again though on 18th February (Ukraine: Deadly 
clashes around parliament in Kiev). This time the situation got much 
more violent with plenty of people killed, especially on 20th Febru-
ary when police used snipers and live ammunition (Traynor). In 
this situation an agreement between Victor Yanukovych and the 
oppositional politicians was signed, according to which a national 
unity government was to be installed and the presidential elections 
were to take place by the end of the year (Ukrainian president and 
opposition sign early poll deal). Shortly after the president disap-
peared and the Ukrainian parliament removed him from his posi-
tion. Olexander Turchynov was selected as an interim president, 
while Arseniy Yatsenyuk was nominated as prime minister on 26th 
February (Ukraine crisis timeline).
The Olympic Games in Sochi ended on 23rd February, at the 
same time when the political crisis in Ukraine was beginning 
to fade. Only a few days later unexpected occurrences began to be 
held in Crimean Peninsula, a territory that was transferred from 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1954. Beginning from 27th February, armed 
men began to seize government buildings in Simferopol, the capital 
of Crimea (Salem, Walker, Harding). According to observers, the 
gunmen were in fact Russian soldiers with no badges on their uni-
forms, however it was not confirmed. Soon the Russian involvement 
in Crimea began to be even more evident, especially after Russia’s 
upper house of parliament approved Putin’s request to use Russian 
forces in Ukraine (Russian parliament approves troop deployment in 
Ukraine). Russian troops also appeared in Crimea, although they 
were in unmarked uniforms and did not admit being Russians, 
Vladimir Putin admitted in April that there were Russian soldiers 
operating in Crimea, even though he earlier claimed they were self-
defense forces (Karmanau, Isachenkov). Involvement of Russia is 
evident then.
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On 6th March, the local parliament of Crimea and city council of 
Sevastopol voted in favor of joining Russia and declared a referen-
dum to be held 10 days later (Sevastopol and Crimean parliament 
vote to join Russia, referendum to be held in 10 days). The referen-
dum, boycotted by various groups such as Crimean Tatars, was de-
clared a great win by separatists. According to official results, 83.1 
percent of eligible population voted and 96.77 percent were in favor 
of joining Russia. On 17th March, Crimean local parliament voted 
to break away from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation. This 
happened officially on 18th March when Vladimir Putin signed the 
treaty of annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol (Morello, Englund, 
Witte; Brenner; Smith, Eshchenko).
The background of Russian annexation of Crimea has been de-
scribed shortly above. The occurrences raise a question concerning 
the rationale for such decisions by Vladimir Putin. Apparently, there 
seem to be two explanations. The first one concerns the majority of 
ethnic Russians among Crimean population. Such circumstances 
obviously may have led to Russian involvement. The second rea-
son may be connected with political events in Ukraine prior to the 
Crimean Crisis. President Viktor Yanukovytch, who was in favor of 
close bounds with Russia instead of European Union, was ousted 
from the post. Such a situation resembles the one in Afghanistan 
in 1979. Ukraine floating towards the West meant the deterioration 
of the Russian area of influence. Putin, on the other hand, wants 
Russia to be strong. Showing such a Russia was one of the objec-
tives of organizing the Sochi Olympics. Annexing Crimea could be 
seen as more proof of that by showing that Russia is capable of 
defending its compatriots. Moreover, Putin’s aim in Ukraine most 
probably was, and still is, to destabilize the situation in hope of ei-
ther spreading the country or making it float back towards Moscow.
Russian involvement in Ukraine may at the same time draw 
conclusions concerning the PR reasons for hosting the Olympic 
Winter Games in Sochi. As has been noted, a number of possible 
motivations can be listed, such as the desire to show Russia pow-
erful and civilized, both to the people of Russia and to the word. 
Vladimir Putin ceased any further actions concerning Ukraine until 
the Olympic were over, probably in order to avoid political con-
troversies during the event. Both occurrences seem to show Rus-
sia from the completely different perspective, but at the same time 
some commonalities between them can be seen. It may be assumed 
that if the main objective of Sochi Olympics was to show Russia 
powerful, then the key aim of the involvement in the Ukraine might 
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have been similar. In respect to such assumption there was no 
dissonance between the two events. Such prepositions implies 
however, that all other objectives of the Sochi Olympics, such 
as showing Russia in good light to international audience, were 
additional and minor only.
Russia’s International Image after the Crimean Crisis 
in the Context of the Sochi Olympics
The occurrences in Crimea, as well as the latter approaches 
to destabilize the situation particularly in eastern Ukraine, led 
to vast criticism from the international community. Sanctions were 
imposed on Russia, however they are usually described as minor 
and encompassed mostly travel bans and assets freezes imposed 
on individuals and companies (Ukraine crisis: Russian officials 
targeted by sanctions). States, especially European ones, seemed 
to appreciate economical bounds with Russia and were uneager 
to cut them.
On the other hand, a completely new attitude towards Russia 
could be seen in statements of high profile international politicians 
or journalists, who condemned Russia and its president for the 
events in Ukraine. In fact, only a very few world leaders supported 
Putin in his policy towards Ukraine, such as Afghanistan’s gov-
ernment, the president of Venezuela Nicolas Maduro, and Syria’s 
president Bashar al-Assad (Wachnicki). Even Alexander Lukash-
enko, President of Belarus, close ally of Russia, said that Russia’s 
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea was setting a “bad precedent,” al-
though in the end he also recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea 
(Belarus Says Russia’s Annexation of Crimea Sets a ‘Bad Precedent).
Apart from a few examples mentioned above, the vast major-
ity of states condemned Putin. American President Barack Obama 
said, for instance, that Russia was no more than a “regional power” 
whose actions in Ukraine were an expression of weakness rather 
than strength (Borger). German Chancellor Angela Merkel called 
Russia’s effort towards annexing Crimea “the imperialism of past 
centuries” (Parkin, Buergin). French President Francois Hollande 
said on March 18, that “Crimea’s joining Russia is “unacceptable” 
and France will never recognize legality of such actions” (President 
Hollande: France doesn’t recognize Crimea’s annexation by Russia). 
Poland was especially harsh in criticizing Russia’s policy concerning 
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Crimea and Ukraine in general. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
commented it saying, that the international community cannot ac-
cept the annexation of Crimea and compared the situation to the 
Yalta Conference (Annexation of Crimea by Russia? Tusk talks about 
the new Jalta).
The new, negative perception of Russia can be interpreted not 
only from official statements of political leaders, but also from all 
sort of other controversies that appear. One of them worth mention-
ing concerns former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. He was 
criticized by the international media after pictures showing him em-
bracing Vladimir Putin during his birthday party in Sankt Petersburg 
were published. Shortly after, German government distanced itself 
with Schroeder (Kirschbaum, Barkin; Glanfield). In this case the con-
demnation of Gerhard Schroeder was massive. Obviously, there are 
also other signs of negative attitude towards Russia after the Crime-
an Crisis. For example, in Poland some hotel owners refused to host 
guests from Russia (Otto). Although such situations are occasional, 
especially in the Western societies a change of attitude towards Rus-
sia is visible. According to survey undertaken by Gallup, 68 percent 
of Americans perceive Russia as “unfriendly” or as the “enemy” and 
these figures have grown recently – before the crisis such perception 
shared 44 percent, in 2006 only 20 percent (Swift).
It can be said that Russia and its president Vladimir Putin have 
been criticized and condemned by the world, especially be the West, 
in respect to the events in Crimea. However, it appears that the 
negative attitude towards Russia is not comprehensive and most 
of the states still give priority to economic benefits of trading with 
Russia. This could be clearly seen in the issue of international sanc-
tions against Russia, which have been relatively soft and directed 
against single people instead of the whole country. The main steps 
included assets freezes and visa bans (EU imposes new sanctions 
against Russia after Putin signs bill annexing Crimea). Russia was 
also ousted from the G8 Group and NATO suspended cooperation 
with Moscow (Smale, Shear; Croft, Siebold). On the other hand, 
France did not resign from the $1.66 billion contract to supply Rus-
sia with Mistral warships (Irish, Pennetier, Pineau), while Austrian 
company OMV has signed with Russia’s Gazprom a memorandum 
to build a spur from the South Stream pipeline to Austria (UP-
DATE 2-OMV and Gazprom press on with Austrian branch of South 
Stream gas pipeline). Such situations, which are not exactly rare, 
imply that although the critics towards Russia is massive and the 
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perception of this country has deteriorated after the Crimean Crisis, 
there has not been a deep and comprehensive change of the Rus-
sia’s image so far.
Conclusions
Vladimir Putin did not hide the main objectives of hosting the 
Olympic Games in Sochi. They were aimed at showing both to the 
world and to its own citizens the new Russia, strong as it once was. 
They were also aimed to make Russia more attractive in establish-
ing relations with other countries. Thus, the objective of hosting 
Olympic Winter Games was to enhance Russia’s soft power. As it 
appears, Russia did succeed in achieving this aim. Although the 
Games showed Russia as not fully efficient, concerning to what 
extent the budget was exceeded and that the last works were be-
ing done just before the Games’ opening, they also showed that no 
matter how big the obstacles are, the Russia’s priority goals would 
be accomplished.
It remains a puzzle, why after achieving such difficult and ex-
pensive purpose as described above, Vladimir Putin decided to take 
a completely opposite step just as the Olympics were finished. By 
involving in the crisis in Ukraine and eventually annexing the 
Crimean Peninsula, he completely changed the way Russia was 
perceived abroad. All the positive emotions evoked by the Sochi 
Olympics were changed towards condemnation of Russian policy, 
although this change of attitude is not complete.
The answer to this puzzle is possible if it is assumed that show-
ing Russia to the world as a civilized country (as the “new Russia”) 
was only an additional aim, whereas the main objective was to proj-
ect image of Russia as a powerful state, capable of fulfilling its goals 
and that the objects of such projection were the Russian people 
and possibly societies of the countries already under Russian influ-
ence. In compliance with such assumption, the purpose of annexing 
Crimea was at least partly similar to the Sochi Olympics objective 
– to project dominant self-imaginary of the Russian state.
Concerning the facts above, it appears that the hypothesis that 
by annexing Crimea Russia squandered all the possible positive 
effects of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games is partly confirmed. Of 
course it did negatively change the perception of Russia, especially 
in the West, but concerning the fact that the main purpose of the 
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Games was to show Russia’s strength, the annexation of Crimea 
was just another prove of that, at the same time showing the inca-
pacity of the international community to prevent it. Still, it appears 
that the annexation was not planned before the political crisis in 
Ukraine.
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